Why is Quantum Gaining Traction in Japan & South Korea?
Japan and South Korea's Quantum Computing Strategy: Export or Die
Japan and South Korea’s intense focus on quantum computing stems from the same existential anxiety that drives much of their industrial policy: they are resource-poor nations that must out-innovate and out-manufacture to survive. Both countries watched with alarm as they missed or underperformed in the software and internet revolutions, ceding enormous economic ground to the United States and China. Quantum computing represents a rare opportunity to get in on the ground floor of what could be a foundational technology shift — one where the winners could dominate everything from drug discovery to cryptography to financial modeling for the next fifty years. The recent wave of announcements from quantum companies, including D-Wave’s continued push in quantum annealing systems and competitors like IBM, Google, and various startups racing toward fault-tolerant quantum computers, has only intensified the urgency. Both countries recognize that if they wait to see who wins, they’ll be locked into being customers rather than suppliers of critical quantum infrastructure.
This is the same playbook both nations have executed repeatedly with other strategic industries, just with higher stakes. Japan’s massive subsidies to bring TSMC fabrication to Kumamoto and its support for Rapidus’ moonshot chip ambitions mirror the quantum investments flowing through RIKEN and university partnerships. South Korea’s dominance in memory chips and EV batteries came from the government and chaebols deciding these would be national priorities and then flooding them with capital for decades — accept losses during downturns, keep building capacity, and strangle competitors through sheer persistence. Now you’re seeing similar multi-billion dollar commitments to quantum research centers, corporate quantum labs at Samsung and Fujitsu, and government roadmaps treating quantum as infrastructure rather than R&D.
Geopolitics is Driving Investment
The geopolitical logic is simple but addresses a dire need: neither country has oil, rare earth minerals, arable land, or really any natural resources to speak of. Japan imports virtually all its energy and food. South Korea is in the same boat, with the added vulnerability of being a peninsula attached to a hostile neighbor. Their entire modern prosperity is built on importing raw materials and exporting finished goods, knowledge, and technology. If they can’t maintain a technological edge — if they become mere assemblers of other countries’ IP or consumers of other countries’ platforms — their economic models collapse. Quantum computing, like semiconductors or advanced batteries before it, isn’t just another tech sector for these nations. It’s an insurance policy against irrelevance, a bet that if they can be among the handful of countries that master this technology, they can continue to export knowledge and high-value products rather than become dependency economies. In a world increasingly defined by tech sovereignty and supply chain nationalism, countries without natural resources don’t have the luxury of being late to transformative technologies.
There are several other crucial geopolitical drivers that make quantum computing particularly urgent for both countries:
The China Factor is enormous. Both Japan and South Korea are watching China pour tens of billions into quantum research, with the Chinese government treating it as a matter of national priority on par with semiconductors or AI. China has already demonstrated quantum satellite communications and claims various quantum computing milestones. For Tokyo and Seoul, the prospect of being technologically sandwiched between an increasingly assertive China and a sometimes-unpredictable America is terrifying. If China achieves quantum supremacy in key areas while Japan and Korea lag behind, it fundamentally shifts the regional power balance. They need indigenous quantum capabilities not just for economic reasons but to avoid becoming technologically subordinate to Beijing.
Cryptographic sovereignty is another massive concern that often goes understated. Quantum computers powerful enough to break current encryption standards (RSA, elliptic curve cryptography) would compromise everything from military communications to financial systems to state secrets. Both countries are acutely aware that their national security, financial infrastructure, and diplomatic communications currently rely on cryptography that may have a shelf life. Developing post-quantum encryption and quantum key distribution isn’t optional — it’s existential. And they want this capability to be homegrown, not entirely dependent on American or Chinese solutions. The intelligence and military implications alone justify enormous investment.
Finally, there’s the alliance equation. Both countries exist under the US security umbrella, but neither wants to be a purely dependent client state. Having advanced technological capabilities — whether in quantum computing, semiconductors, or defense technology — gives them more leverage and value in the alliance. It’s the difference between being a strategic partner and being strategically irrelevant. Especially given US political volatility in recent years and questions about the reliability of American commitments, Tokyo and Seoul want to ensure they bring enough to the table that abandonment becomes unthinkable. Technology is one of the few cards they can play.